{"id":5068,"date":"2026-10-06T04:23:56","date_gmt":"2026-10-06T04:23:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cyberasia.io\/?p=5068"},"modified":"2026-10-06T04:23:59","modified_gmt":"2026-10-06T04:23:59","slug":"ddos-rippersec-tv7-israel-news","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cyberasia.io\/article\/ddos\/ddos-rippersec-tv7-israel-news\/","title":{"rendered":"DDoS RipperSec Revealed: 10 Pieces of Evidence That TV7 Israel News Was Paralyzed"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The TV7 Israel News <\/mark><\/strong>website returned error codes 500, 502, 503, and 504<\/mark><\/strong> from dozens of monitoring points in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and Oceania after a DDoS RipperSec attack hit its web ports 80 and 443 on 4 September 2026. The homepage was replaced by a maintenance message, while several test points showed only a timeout screen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ten-part series of screenshots compiled by CyberAsia.io shows check-host reports, attack tool logs, bot panels, and photos of error pages. From that material, the timing of the incident, the HTTP codes, and the coordination pattern behind this operation can be mapped.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 1: contains a post reading done check, a tool log named Cybernetic Wolf with 1,000 threads, and a bot panel marking the target as DOWN [503] at second 33 of 100. <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\"Figure
Figure 2: adds a check-host table and a photo of a 500 Internal Server Error page with an nginx background, complete with a message of praise for the members.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Timeline of the DDoS RipperSec Attack on 4 September<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This DDoS RipperSec operation was named #OpZionistV2<\/mark><\/strong>. The target announcement (Figure 3) names TV7 Israel News as the objective, along with a schedule of 21:00 GMT+8 on 4 September 2026, ports 80 and 443, and the network Lighthouse Network Ltd Oy. Its closing message reads “Stop K*llings People, We Are Watching Your Action”, followed by thanks to the allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 3 : Target announcement for #OpZionistV2 with a 21:00 GMT+8 schedule<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The attack tool log records the start of the attack at 13:04. If that time is UTC, the attack began about five minutes after the scheduled 21:00 GMT+8.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Soon afterward, the TV7 DOWN post circulated. It contained a photo of a 500 error<\/mark><\/strong>, a caption stating a one-hour duration (Figure 4), and a message linking this action to the deaths of Palestinian journalists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 4 : Check-host report with the RipperSec logo and TV7 DOWN post<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The times below follow what the screenshots display. A bot panel in another participant group marked the target DOWN at 20:04, and the check-host report link was shared at 20:19. The 20:53 table was still mixed, with 200 OK, timeout, and 500 results, a sign that the disruption was not yet evenly spread in the early hours. The 500 error photo followed at 21:44 and the green and red map at 23:24, before the 5Hour Done caption appeared at 10:04 with additional reports up to 11:33.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

RipperSec uses a skull emblem adorned with a crescent moon and Arabic writing on its publicity materials (Figure 5). The emblem is also stamped on the check-host screenshot in Figure 4 and the world map in Figure 9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 5 : RipperSec emblem, the group behind DDoS RipperSec<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Technical Evidence: Error Codes and Latency<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Check-host sends requests from dozens of servers in many countries, so a single report can distinguish a site that is down in all regions from one that is merely slow in one place. In this DDoS RipperSec case, the results lean toward a multi-region disruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 5Hour Done caption arrived together with a MegaMedusa log that repeatedly wrote TV7 Israel News under maintenance (503)<\/mark><\/strong>. About an hour later, the check-host table at 11:00 showed 504 Gateway Timeout errors from locations on various continents (Figure 6).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 6 : MegaMedusa 503 log and check-host table with 504 errors<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 7 shows another pattern. The 502 Bad Gateway code arrived within milliseconds, with 9 from Helsinki, 76 from Langen, and 84 from Nuremberg. A response that fast usually indicates that the server’s front layer is still alive and answering, while the application behind it cannot reply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Test points in Netanya and Tel Aviv also received 502, so the disruption was not limited to access from outside Israel. One point in Hungary, on the other hand, ended with connection timed out and no HTTP code at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 7 : MegaMedusa v3.2 and check-host table with 502 errors<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Tools and Coordination Patterns<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The DDoS RipperSec pattern points to an HTTP request flood at the application layer. Cybernetic Wolf ran with 1,000 threads and a list of user agents, while MegaMedusa version 3.2<\/mark><\/strong> loaded a list of proxies and more than ten machines switched on at the same time. Its log is filled with Request timed out and ECONNABORTED (Figure 8). Codes 502, 503, and 504 arriving alternately commonly appear when the proxy in front of an application runs out of connections or wait time, not when the network is overwhelmed by volumetric traffic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 8 : Request timed out log and 47-second video<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

DDoS RipperSec did not operate alone. One of the screenshots shows another group of 465 members with a bot running a TLS-type attack against the same address, with some of the conversation in Indonesian (Figure 1). The group also shared a 47-second video clip and a 3-minute 13-second audio file as publicity material, not technical evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Related reading: [https:\/\/cyberasia.io\/articles\/<\/strong><\/mark><\/a>: related hacktivist DDoS report on CyberAsia.io]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Impact on TV7 Israel News<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Figure 9 compares two check-host maps dated 4 September 2026, one predominantly green and the other red. On the red map, Sofia failed completely with an ERR_CANCELED error, while Tirana, Sydney, Novi Travnik, and Sao Paulo received 503 responses. Tirana’s average latency was 489.9 milliseconds with a peak of 1,632 milliseconds, Sydney’s 619.8 milliseconds, and Sao Paulo’s 298.9 milliseconds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 9 : Green and red check-host maps for DDoS RipperSec<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 10 closes the series of evidence: a repeating 503 Service Unavailable log, a red map, and a browser screen showing the site as unreachable. What was affected was the website, not the broadcast. The maintenance page states that all programs can still be watched through the TV7 Israel News YouTube channel, so core broadcasting did not automatically stop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Figure
Figure 10 : 503 log and TV7 Israel News maintenance page<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The direct impact was on readers’ access to news on the site during the hours of disruption, which according to the group’s posts lasted up to five hours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mitigation Steps for Site Admins<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The joint guidance from CISA, the FBI, and MS-ISAC<\/mark><\/a><\/strong> divides DDoS attacks into three types: volumetric, protocol, and application. The DDoS RipperSec case falls into the last type. Practical steps for media site admins:<\/p>\n\n\n\n